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A BST RAC T 
In spite of the rhetoric of viability and endogenously led growth 
and development, small states are generally resigned to a status 
of dependency, surviving as rentier economies and remi ttance 
societies. Most appear determined today that their best (and 
only?) bet is for even better integration within the world 
economic order. They may have decolonised but they have no 
intention to disengage. To do so effectively, they often seek to 
establish a life-line to richer countries. 
Nevertheless, lip service to self-directed development, and a 
sound policy of economic management to that effect, is an 
important exercise: It generates and guarantees the establ ishment 
and preservation of sufficiently intimate relations with 
prosperous and benevolent sponsors. 
This paper explores the changing fortunes of Malta's experience 
in development planning (1959-1988) from this perspective. It 
appraises the economic success story of the resource poor island 
state, independent from Britain since 1964, while chasing the 
elusive phantom of viability and self-reliance. The latter has 
persisted stubbornly on the distant horizon; but the public 
relations exercise in this chase has been profitable in securing 
transfers and investments from abroad, perhaps turning topsy 
turvy the notion of unequal exchange from periphery to core. 
Membership into the European Communities (EC) may yet consolidate 
Malta's position as a "pampered periphery" ... 
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I: Sovereignty in the Microstate Context 
" ... Here at least 
We shall be free ... 
Here we may reign secure, and in my choice 
To reign is worth ambition, though in hell: 
Better to reign in hell than serve in heaven" 
John Milton, Paradise Lost - Book I, lines 258-262. 
Milton's Satan serves conveniently as a symbol of defiant 
nationalism. He is the prototype rebel against global hegemonic 
forces; he is bent on sovereignty, freedom and delinking 
strategies, at any cost. Entrusted with economic planning in 
Chaos, he would no doubt have sought self-sustained growth and 
viability. But for all his superhuman flamboyance, Milton's 
cosmic villain is seeped in compassionate irony, a mock-heroism 
which results from the blindness of being ostracised from God 
Almighty. Independence is proudly claimed but nevetheless sounds 
hollow. It is a reckless initiative, an expression not of gain 
but of loss of stature and in the quality of life. 
Most so for the world's smallest territories, all of which are 
islands or enclaves. The domestic political forces of Lilliput 
have been more fervently engaged at forestalling independence 
than clamouring for it(l). For them, cashing in sovereignty is 
not only an extravagant proposition but an impoverishing one as 
well(2). Independence may conjure up illusions of autonomy and 
sovereignty but the unwelcome predicament of marginalisation, 
destabilisation and empoverishment, especially for resource poor 
terri tories, looks even more likely. There are today various 
examples of "upside down decolonisation", the initiative towards 
independence due not some much to the efforts of the dependent 
territories but to the readiness of the colonizing powers to send 
their colonies on their way (3) . And among those territories 
which did achieve political independence, microstates have been 
either among the very last to do so(4); or they otherwise 
decolonised without any intenton to disengage (5). Sovereign 
statehood is no enviable goal, no absolute ideal - after all 
small isolated island terri tories are already significantly self-
governing units. Only when statehood is seen as the key to more 
and better resources, is it then fervently pursued. But, even 
then, the case is often a rhetorical one. 
The small territory's answer has been a polite "No, Thank You" 
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to the satanic bravado: Far better, they claim, to serve in 
heaven than to reign in hell. An island that rules itself may be 
proud of priming its own pump; but whether there is anything 
there to pump, and preferably, whether there is more to pump, is 
the real issue. After all, the smallness of these sites, their 
cosmopolitan character and possibly their strategic location, 
seem to allow the world's smallest territories, the periphery of 
the periphery, the miraculous possibili ty of turning unequal 
exchange topsy turvy, thriving on a net transfer of value from 
the core(6). In a sense, it seems as if these flotsam and jetsam 
of empire have always been meant to be attached to something 
larger(7). This goes against the grain of orthodox development 
policy, "which is likely to reduce their present economic 
dependence, that is one which is likely to make their economies 
less open and promote internally propelled development" (8) . 
For Sale or Rent 
How is such economic survival worked out in practice? Small 
country governments after all project their territories as ready-
to-go productive enterprises, needing only the proverbial kiss 
of Prince Charming - alias for~Lgn investment with associated 
foreign market outlets - to spring to life. Development Plans, 
representing the projected economic activity and expansion by the 
state over a three-to-five year period, often read as perpetual 
attempts at "taking off", Rostow style, into self-sustained and 
vigorous economic growth, with export oriented manufacturing as 
the "seductive option" (9) . 
Nevertheless, while this picture may assuage international 
sponsors and funding bodies, it rarely tells the true story. 
Firstly, the impression of control over economic expansion and 
the direction of that expansion which permeates development plans 
is hopelessly naive and false. It bears little understanding of 
the real world with its erratic changes and shifts to which small 
territories with their open economies and mono-commodity 
orientations are particularly prone. The task of the planner 
becomes much like an exercise in tea leaf reading(10). And the 
price to be paid for enticing export oriented industries is 
typically very costly: Many of these end up being actually 
subsidised by tax concessions, repatriation facilities, cheap 
land and power(ll). A low cost yet trained, literate and docile 
labour force and weak trade unions are often added, tacit 
conditionalities (12). 
The main engine of economic growth in small territories has 
rather been a panoply of bewildering services. Most islands and 
other isolated communities have actually developed as centres 
where "cargo" could be stored and/or transhipped. Fuel, 
merchandise, fish, finance, drugs, military, space and 
telecommunications equipment. Human cargo has included slaves, 
prisoners and lately tourists(13). Incomes from such activities 
are not derived from value added but constitute rents: revenues 
which are disassociated from any directly productive activity on 
the part of the recipient(14). The crucial assets here are not 
so much productivity, cheap labour, low transportation costs and 
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economies of scale, as would be of paramount importance to 
manufacturing industry. Small terri tories worldwide would be hard 
put to provide most of these competitively. To the contrary, the 
key variable is marketing the desirability of location. 
"Geographical positioning" provides the otherwise elusive 
comparative advantage(15). 
Who wi 11 be our Master? 
Small jurisdictions have apparently been more successful (success 
here meaning maximising consumption) in preserving or, better 
still, enhancing, their status and desirability, even their 
vulnerability, as such rentier states, territories for sale or 
rent(16). They can earn their way not so much on what they do, 
bu t on what and where thev are, on the basi s of the double 
accident of history and geography. 
Part of this game involves cultivating privileged relationships 
with patrons. Benign paternalism, a long and servile colonial 
association, strategic importance and (increasingly lately) 
environmental hazards are common overtures. Are not the few, 
particularly poor, microstates those which have actually failed 
to establish (or abrogated) sufficiently intimate relations with 
a prosperous protector? If the world's smallest jurisdictions are 
straddled today with chronic non-viability, they «must, 
shamelessly but decorously, shop for willing dominants, ready to 
take them in tow(17). Patterns of autonomy and dependence seem 
best explored in the context of a prized "umbilical" association 
with a willing sponsor; the "management of slavery"(18). 
Yet, once again, ample window dressing is in order: Mend~cancy 
is no dignified strategy to pursue, both for the incumbent and 
its sponsors. A developmental facade and its accompanying 
rhetoric is a crucial component, providing the necessary 
political and economic collateral to justify international 
transfers from abroad and electoral support at home. The 
microstate may also have to make a lot of noise threatening to 
usurp its servile, dependent status(19). Enhancing vulnerability 
also reduces further the extent of control over and influence on 
the processes and dynamics influencing the small territory's 
economic fortunes; but these are generally already beyond 
domestic control in any case. 
This paper examines the changing fortunes of Malta's experience 
in development planning(1959-1988) from the perspective afforded 
by such inductive microstate theorization. It appraises the 
economic success story of the resource poor island state while 
chasing the phantoms of viability and of self-directed economic 
management. Given that Mal ta is practically a "superpower" as far 
as small territories go, the predicament which is illustrated by 
this case study may be expected to be further intensified in 
smaller jurisdictions (20). The issue of membership into the 
European Communities (EC) is presented as a logical, almost 
natural denouement. It may yet consolidate further Malta's 
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position as a (albeit undeclared) pampered periphery ... 
11: The Maltese Experience 
"Malta has had to have a planned economy ... As independence 
was attained in 1964, the haphazardness of the past was 
abandoned and a scientific approach to economic management 
was introduced ... For the first time ... Malta was free to 
determine its fortunes" (21). 
The Maltese Archipelago consists of a series of limestone blocks 
with a surface area of 312 square kilometres, the main island of 
Malta being the largest and supporting 94% of the population. 
These command the centre of the Mediterranean Sea between Italy 
and Libya. Such a strategic location, plus a series of sheltered 
and deep water harbours, has made the islands prime targets for 
successive regional powers. These included the Arabs (870 -
1090); the Knights of St. John Hospitallers (a buffer state for 
Catholic Europe against the Turkish threat) 1530 -1798; and the 
British (1800-1964). Being intrinsically resource poor, bereft 
even of fertile soil or ample fresh water supplies, the 
islanders' main gainstay has been the refurbishing of successive 
military establishments and associated administrative and 
infrastructural public works, financed ultimately from abroad. 
Such a historical rentier "welfare economy" supported a 
population growth now reaching 360,000. 
Mal ta's approach to development planning has been prai sed by 
international observers for being indicative, avoiding a pompous 
air of surety and rigidity which was bound to falter. All the 
same, the actual results achieved after each of Malta's six 
development plans had had its course never approximated to the 
projections; indeed, they dramatically exceeded or failed to meet 
the hoped for targets. 
Thirty Years of Going Wrong 
Malta's First Development Plan (1959-1964) followed hot on the 
heels of the British Government's decision to run down its 
military facility in many overseas bases, including its 
mediterranean fortress colony of Malta. The island's economy was 
in for an unexpected, radical shake up: At that time, the British 
colonial establishment directly employed no less than 23,000 
Maltese - more than a third of the labour force(22); most of the 
remaining 40,000 were employed directly by Government(23). 
Bri tish mili tary personnel and associated expendi tures were going 
to be drastically cut. While this was a stark and sombre reality, 
the securing of an al ternative source of livelihood for the 
Maltese was another matter. Even eminent foreign advisors 
disagreed about the prospects of restructuring the Maltese 
economy: Woods(1945) had little faith in anything except mass 
emigration; Schuster (1950) was mildly more encouraging; Balogh 
& Seers(1955) would be best described as cautiously 
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optimistic(24). All in all, the small economy had some 
interesting potential - industry, tourism, commercial shiprepair 
related to the island's natural assets: climate, human 
resources and maritime facilities in a strategic location(25). 
It was Government's task to develop the policies and concomitant 
economic, social and physical infrastructure in these 
departments. 
Claiming that the success will depend in the last resort on the 
enterprise, skill and productivity of all sections of the 
community is one spirit rousing way of putting it(26). Owning the 
problem is one technique for justifying remedial action. But 
whether investments, tourists and shipowners would be actually 
attracted, and in sufficient and steady numbers to provide a 
relatively secure source of income and employment was the all 
important corollary. What the Plan could and did do was a 
statistical exercise in fortune telling, hoping that, like a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, the desired dream would take flesh. The 
first plan, seeking full employment yet acknowledging the 
difficul ty of putting a precise figure to the decline in the 
services and crown employment levels, foresaw the need to create 
19,000 new jobs, 5,000 in a fledgling manufacturing industry. It 
was deemed reasonable to assume that 10,000 employables would 
emigrate over the 5-year plan period(27). Possibly, the 
meticulous nature of this plan was a necessary condition for the 
securing of the 29 million pounds sterling the British Government 
was providing to finance the plan' scapi tal spending 
requirements. In a sense, this Development Plan followed 
naturally as the expression by the Maltese Government of its 
undertaking to utilise this development loan effectively(28). 
The hoped for results, however, did not materialise. Indeed, the 
plan had to be reviewed in 1961 after an Anglo-Maltese study 
group set up to examine the repercussions of the rundown of the 
British military apparatus concluded that Malta was in for a 
rough ride, rougher than had been envisaged, unless ulterior 
measures were taken: A GDP drop of 15% and an unemployment figure 
of 29,000 (28% of the labour force) by 1967 were expected(29). 
When the plan period expired, few of the promised goods had been 
delivered: "The plan did not achieve the projected aims mainly 
due to the fact that it was overtaken by events ... the anticipated 
employment figures were not attained"(30). "The plan was not a 
complete success ... Too much was expected of the private sector 
in too short a time and the employment objectives were not, in 
fact, met"(31). 
The targets of the Second Development Plan(1964-69) were set with 
extreme caution. A report by a United Nations Mission 
Stolper(1964) - confirmed a bleak future and advised a mass 
yearly emigration quota of 10,000 to maintain extant living 
standards. The once bitten, twice shy, government functionaries 
were not carried away by the euphoria of political independence, 
achieved in 1964: They envisaged this second plan as an 
instrument of containment: "little more was expected of it than 
that it should keep the economy ticking"(32). 
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The Plan envisaged the crea~~on of 3,600 jobs in industry and 
tourism, a doubling of experts and an annual emigration of 7,500 
persons. An increase in the female participation rate was also 
hypothesized. The idea was to maintain the current level of 
unemployment with an absolute decrease in the labour supply(33). 
Britain's sudden decision ~o devalue the pound sterling in 1967 
did not help matters(34). Yet, the outcome went beyond 
expectations: "The second five year plan has been an experience 
of rapid economic expansion in circumstances which did not 
initially bode well for Malta's future"(35). The main challenge 
had been to contain: the actual outcome was al together more 
favourable. Gainful employment at end 1968 had been expected to 
fall to 83,000 per plan from 86,000 in 1964. It was actually 
95,800 in 1969. GNP in real terms had risen by some 38% from 
1964-68(36). Optimism was suddenly riding high: A Joint Anglo-
Maltese mission early in 1967 led by Lord Robens claimed that a 
target of 15,000 new jobs by 1972 was now favourable. 
The Third Development Plan (1969-74) sought to maintain the same 
basic recipe for economic growth. The one major novel initiative 
was an Association Agreement wi th the European Communi ties . This 
meant "to provide an export market in Europe for Maltese output 
free from tariff barriers and quota restrictions" (37) . An 
employment target of 106,400 was envi saged by 1973 - a net 
increase of 4,700 in the labour force. The net increase would be 
mainly seen to via an increase of 5,500 jobs in manufacturing and 
1,500 jobs in tourism, plus an annual exodus of 2,400 emigrants. 
The actual state of affairs in 1974 was of a gainfully occupied 
population of 102,300 and of an unemployment rate of almost 6%. 
But the planners were thi s time spared the embarrassment of 
explaining what had gone wrong (exogenous reasons were not 
lacking - the 1973 energy price hike being one significant 
explanatory factor). The planners, and the plan with them, had 
been changed. 
The Fourth Development Plan (1973-80) cut short the life of its 
predecessor. A new party had come to power in 1971 on a platform 
of neutrality and non-alignment and it proposed a much stronger 
presence by the state in economic development. Yet, while the 
rhetoric was distinctly different, the plan's growth leaders were 
the usual ones manufacturing, shiprepair/ building and 
tourism. It looks in retrospect much like a case of old wine in 
new bottles. After all, most politicians would have us believe 
that significant shifts in economic indicators can occur at the 
pOint where a change in government takes place; however one can 
barely identify any such significant break(38). What had 
definitely changed was the irreversible termination of the 
British base. The closure had been mercifully extended to March 
31st 1979 and annual rent until that date had been tripled, 
following hard bargaining, to US$42million. (The bargaining 
exercise is a case study in itself and exemplifies the 
disproportionate potential lobbying power of microstates on the 
world stage). 1979 was therefore "the year of destiny" and the 
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Plan sought to meet the challenge which the loss of the 
significant fortress rent and other multiplier effects would 
inevitably cause. 
The Plan targeted GDP at factor cost to grow at 6% per annum. It 
also assumed emigration levels of almost 3,000 persons per year. 
The projected labour supply was thus about 115,900. Therefore, 
provision had to be made for around 20,600 jobs, of which 13,500 
in manufacturing, to match the redundancies from the Military 
Base closure and an increasing female participation rate 
projected to reach 35.5%(39). 
The Plan's targets were introduced with an indicative, cautionary 
note: "The Maltese islands are heavily dependent on international 
trade. Planning in Malta must therefore be particularly flexible. 
Flexibility means the creation and encouragement of attitudes and 
institutions that are capable of making good use quickly of a 
favourable turn of events in the world economy, and of adjusting 
speedily to unfavourable circumstances" (40). 
The results? Instead of a net population decline of 1% which the 
plan had forecast, there was a net increase of 5.7% over the 
period 1973-79, mainly because of unforeseen tighter immigration 
controls by the traditional destination countries of Maltese 
emigrants. Nevertheless, the gainfully occupied had soared by 
16,300, of which just over 8,000 in manufacturing. This was still 
a shortfall to the plan target; but, mercifully for the planners, 
the female participation rate had only increased marginally: 
14,000 women had not joined the labour force contrary to what had 
been projected. Increases in productivity had been higher than 
envisaged, leading to a reduced demand for labour. GDP at factor 
cost had grown at the fantastic annual rate of 14.3%. 
And so, the planners could, for the second time, afford 
themselves the luxury of demonstrating publicly their good 
fortune (and their hopeless predictive powers!). As in the case 
of the unexpected success of the second plan, the unexpected 
success of the fourth plan was meticulously documented and 
proudly paraded in the introduction to the subsequent planning 
instrument. The Fifth Development Plan (1981-85) exhibited the 
fortuitous discrepancy, for which some credit would spill over 
to the government of the day(41). 
Having overcome the 'year of destiny' in apparently very good 
shape, the fifth plan could once again venture to look ahead with 
optimism. Reverting to the more conventional five-year planning 
period, this document had a target of 7,000 new jobs in 
manufacturing and 3,000 in market services, with a freeze on 
public sector employment - then at a 'low' of 20% of the labour 
force. This to tally with a labour force incr~ase of 10,000, 
reaching 133,100 (42). 
The Plan went totally wrong: The targets set out by the plan for 
exports, employment and investment were not reached. A 
"containment strategy" had to be introduced to stave off the 
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effects of a damaging international recession (coupled with an 
overvalued local currency and declining standards in a tourist 
industry which had grown too fast). Manufacturing employment 
actually declined from 33% of the labour force in 1979 to 28% in 
1985; unemployment reached a record 8% over 1983 and 1984 (43). 
The euphoria of planning was once again replaced by 
disillusionment. The sixt:n, latest (and possible last?) 
Development Plan covers only a three year period: 1986-88. It 
appears that the dangers of bold projection had been learnt, and 
the confession appears quite sincere: 
"The Development Plan for Malta 1986-1988 is unlike previous 
plan documents ... the time span has been shortened to three 
years in view of the various unpredictable external forces 
that are expected to continue to weigh heavily upon Malta's 
development" (44). 
"Recent experience has shown even more sharply the exposure 
of the Maltese economy to international economic 
developments and their impact on the country's overall 
growth process. In these unsettled conditions, planning has 
been rendered more hazardous and it has become less 
meaningful to formulate development plans, spell out broad 
sectoral targets and draw up projections for future years, 
when outside shocks can be so frequent and unpredictable and 
prove so disruptive" (45). 
This time, there is no elaborate review of the achievements of 
the previous plan; no comparison of past projections with 
achieved results. 
The Sixth Plan seems mainly consumed by the need to exculpate 
government of the failure of the previous plan targets. In this 
exercise of exoneration, it is however unique because the bitter 
lesson is extrapolated forward: The numerical exposition of 
targets - investment finance, labour force participation rates, 
demographic figures, import and export values - are noticeable 
by their low profile. There is indeed only one table in the 
document. The Plan limits itself basically to a description and 
discussion of projects and incentive schemes which government 
felt, by and large, in a position to accomplish. Nevertheless, 
the plan's practically only target of 5,400 jobs "which should 
be provided in the directly productive and market service 
sectors", was not reached. The increase in labour supply, 
augmented by further shedding from the pri va te sector, was 
handled by "workfare" employment in the public, paramilitary and 
parastatal sectors. 
If "it has become less meaningful to formulate development plans" 
(46), why have them at all? Interestingly, the present Maltese 
government has opted in February 1990 to ditch the ceremony of 
development plans and switch to "planning", particularly in areas 
and policies where local planners have wider spans of control and 
where a stronger degree of predictability can be assumed. 
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The change could be merely academic, as one shall see below. But 
the "turnabout" did not fail to generate strident criticism. A 
senior economic consultant (Now leader of the Opposition) 
criticised the sudden demise of formal development planning as 
"a failure of nerve", a repudiation of government's 
responsibility to provide an overall and long term coordinating 
framework for total economic management and the disowning of a 
tool of accountability of government's economic policies(47). 
Possibly, the political discretion suggested by the latter 
criticism may be one important consideration which led to scrap 
the plan concept: There are now no glorified targets about which 
one can be criticised if they are not met. One must not fail to 
add here, however, the stark realisation of the unenviable 
predicament in which any local policy maker is likely to find 
him\herself, having to justify plans and planning which always 
go wrong, one way or the other. A senior financier and ardent 
government sympathizer has nevertheless argued that, with such 
a shift in policy, economic management is changing to hidden 
mental strategism or (perhaps worse) ad hocism(48). A shocking 
insight into what dare not be admitted? 
In the Prime Minister's own words, a development plan. indicative 
though it may be, makes for rigidity, as the experience of past 
plans has shown that they have "gone totally wrong, and what they 
forecast had nothing to do with what actually happened"(4~). The 
advisory National Economic Development Council has counselled 
that " a formal (development) plan could serve as an obstacle and 
rigidity if it is implemented and, if not implemented, then it 
would become no more than an irrelevancy" (50). 
The Spinoffs of the Planning Form 
The admission of ceremonious formalism and deceptive rhetoric is 
a bold statement indeed, but one which is supported by the 
evidence. Development Planning, as with other institutions of a 
microterritory, may flourish but not function. Yet, the symbolism 
is effective and indicative that governments govern(51). Malta's 
six development plans were to a considerable extent intended as 
public relations exercises, with one eye on the reaction of 
investors and another on that of the electorate; projected growth 
rates may often have been based on dubious and unrealistic 
assumptions (52). Nevertheless, they were laced with a pseudo-
scientific calculability designed to carry along the reader and 
imbue an atmosphere of confidence in the singer of the tune. 
Planning may boil down to a tokenistic activity which is 
nevertheless carried out because it reaps political, economic and 
diplomatic spinoffs. 
If public opinion and potential foreign sponsors/investors thrive 
on planning exercises and the discipline and control that they 
inspire, then such target audiences ought to be thus appeased: 
the baby will not be thrown out with the bath water. If anything, 
they may be even better appeased by sectoral specific planning: 
The European Communi ties have in fact funded a new 20-year 
Structure Plan for the Maltese Islands;the Food & Agricultural 
Organisation is assisting in the setting up of an Agriculture 
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Master Plan; the UNDP has funded, alongside the Italian and 
Brazilian Governments, the setting up of a mul ti-year 
telecommunications investment plan by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) for Malta. 
By why should it prove to be so difficult to plan successfully 
in the Maltese context? The blame could be easily placed full 
square on the incompetence and shortsightedness of planners 
and/or of those entrusted with the plan's implementation. But a 
comprehensive evaluation must perforce consider the impacting of 
external events over which Maltese development planners, for all 
their lip service to economic management, have very li ttle 
control. Put differently, much of the aim of the development 
trajectory has probably been precisely to move away from this 
embarrassingly volatile situation(53). 
Modelling the Character of Vulnerability 
It appears that the small open economy is particularly vulnerable 
to external events in three distinct yet related ways: In 
suddenness of impact. in the intensity of effect and in the 
rapidity of penetration. 
The first concerns the unpredictable and haphazard way in which 
external events impinge on the microterri tory, defying 
prognostication and advance warning. Even where such advance 
warnings may be obtained, the small terri tory may lack the 
finances, personnel, networks or technology to obtain the 
information(54) . 
The second deals with the extensive nature of the spread effect 
and the high responsiveness of the microeconomy to these external 
events. This results from the wide open dependence of the economy 
on exogenous variables: its fragile organisation around very few 
export commodities or services; and its small insular or enclave 
status which staves off or postpones certain influxes but renders 
it even more prone to those infiltrations which manage to 
overcome its physical isolation. 
The third relates to the difficulty of containing the effects of 
external infiltrations, once at hand. The complex interlinkages 
of the microeconomy with its foreign oriented activity renders 
it helpless in shoring up and preventing itself from being 
rapidly overtaken and infused by it. The multiplier effect of 
such impacts not only spares little in its path, but does so 
rapidly and violently, with immediate short term repercussions. 
Hence the microeconomy is characterised by the sudden, rapid and 
total consequences of booms and troughs, each of which may 
therefore be considered as assuming crisis proportions. "Approach 
to a single isolate problem leads extraordinarily rapidly to all 
parts of the complex, more quickly and completely than we have 
observed elsewhere"(55). 
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Interestingly, a discussion on 
epidemics is highly illustrative, and 
serves to capture the three dynamics 
ou tlined above in action (56) . Epidemics 
in island communities are postulated to 
occur less frequently but for them to 
affect a greater proportion of the 
population and wi th a faster speed, 
when they occur. In larger scale 
societies, such as continents, the 
epidemic would move from group to group 
and finally back to the first in a more 




f'igure 1. Epidemics in islonds and continental 
communu;e*s 
All things being equal, the character of this motion is expected 
to become more jerky and spasmodic with increasing smallness of 
territory. 
Such a state of vulnerability has long been endured in the 
Maltese islands. It is not only a recent historical phenomenon, 
even though the gap between the rhetoric of planning and the 
unfolding of economic fortunes subsequent to poli tical 
independence in 1964 has highlighted the pattern even more 
starkly. The fortress economy had meant an almost total 
dependence upon military expenditures. This "offered no stable 
means of livelihood but brought fluctuations according to the 
prevailing international situation and the strategic decisions 
taken by the Colonial and War Offices in London" (57). "The 
economy of the Maltese Islands under Britain took the form of an 
artificial cycle determined not by the vicissi tudes of the 
market, but by the exigencies of military security. War marked 
the upswing of the Maltese economic cycle; the return of peace 
was the harbinger of a downswing"(58). "A pattern of affluence 
and poverty established itself"(59). 
The onset of political independence must have impressed on the 
Mal tese policy makers the importance of breaking out of this 
chaotic and stagnant predicament and to strive for a more noble 
state of viability; an economic growth pattern in which Malta 
would be as sovereign as its political independence implied. In 
this, expert advice from abroad was not lacking. This is best 
spelt out in the introduction to the Second Development Plan. 
This had stated that development planning in Malta was required 
in the context of a long term objective, "to create a competitive 
economic structure largely oriented towards the export market 
... U.N. experts estimate that it would take Malta between 15 and 
25 years before ultimate viability can be achieved ... During this 
period, Malta will require outside help, in terms of know-how, 
grants and loans to achieve the required economic transformation. 
This outside help will be essential until the economy reaches the 
"take off" stage of development, when endogenous forces will be 
expected to support growth and lead the economy to eventual 
maturity" (60). 
Certain observers point out that the hoped for "take off" would 
seem to have occurred in the late sixties(61). The illusion of 
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self-induced growth is established and cultivated, thus imbuing 
confidence in the planners of the day and incentivizing further 
the provision of aid and investment from abroad and of political 
support at home. Whether any such take off has actually occurred 
is debatable. A wry observation - whether a tourist influx and 
a building boom could be justified as a 'take off' in the proper 
meaning of the term; and whether this was actually the result of 
conscious development strategy or of unforseen forces of outside 
demand(62) - was allowed to pass by discretely. 
The mirage of "ultimate viability" and "eventual maturity" has 
persisted stubbornly on the distant horizon. Today, almost 30 
years after that statement was boldly pronounced, Malta is still 
perhaps just as far from any notion of endogenously led, self-
generated development. Nevertheless, the irony is that, the 
process of chasing the viability phantom has proved productive. 
Malta can today boast of a success story which reads as a lesson 
in incorporation and even stronger dependency on exogenous 
forces. This may not be palatable from a nationalistic 
perspective; and it also carries high economic stakes. But such 
may be brushed aside or camouflaged as long as the incorporation 
delivers the economic goods. 
It appears only natural to assume that Malta's bid to join the 
EC is mainly intended to cement insti tutionally this 
incorporation and to guarantee even more solidly the transfer of 
largesse from the core to the small Maltese periphery. 
Interestingly, Malta's first development (sic) strategy, even 
prior to development planning in the 1950s, was actually to seek 
integration with Britain. The Maltese were quick to point out 
that their smallness was a factor which militated in favour of 
such an integration(63). 
ANNEXE: Malta's Present Relationship with the EC * 
Malta's economy is very heavily dependent on trade with the EC 
and on tourists therefrom: 75% of imports and 87% of tourist 
arrivals are of EC provenance, while 77% of domestic exports are 
bound for EC destinations. In this aspect, Malta is already much 
more integrated within the EC than certain EC member states. 
Employment is also largely dependent on investment in Malta by 
EC undertakings. These trends have been on a marked increase 
since the signing of the Association Agreement between Malta and 
the EC in December 1970, this coming into force in April 1971. 
This was the third ever association agreement between the EC and 
a non-member state. 
The aim of the 1970 agreement was to consolidate and extend the 
economic and commercial relations existing between the two 
parties, seeking first the progressive elimination of obstacles 
to trade and, eventually, to establish a customs union. The 
latter never came into force however because of the reluctance 
of the Mal tese Government to dismantle customs import duties 
which still constitute a considerable proportion of its annual 
revenue: 
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"The formation of a customs union on its own is not 
sufficiently attractive for the Maltese Government to 
proceed to its achievement both because the customs union 
on its own would not give to Hal ta the other economic 
advantages which membership brings along wi th it... and 
because the political dimension of forming part of a Europe 
in the process of unification would be completely missing". 
Particularly beneficial to Mal ta has been the suspension of 
customs duty and tariffs on Haltese textiles and clothing 
exports. Malta has also benefitted from three financial protocols 
(1976, 1986 and 1989) which provided altogether 28 mecus as 
grants and 65.5 mecus as loans. 
The two main political parties in Mal ta have taken pains to 
accentuate their different posi tions on the small country's 
relationship to the world's largest trading block: The 
Nationalist Party (in government with a 51% majority since 1987 
and reconfirmed in office with a larger majority in 1992) is keen 
to project Mal ta as having a clear and unequivocal European 
destiny. The Malta Labour Party has argued that accession is 
tantamount to neo-colonialism; it has argued consistently for a 
negotiated relationship between Malta and the EC which is 
different from accession. For a time, it also investigated the 
possibili ty of assisting in the setting up an alternative, 
Mediterranean common market, but without success. These 
differences could be mere academic and are both essentially in 
favour of a stronger relationship between the two bodies. 
Malta formally applied to join the three European Communities 
ECSC, EURATOM and EEC in July 1989.There has been much talk of 
a democratic tradition and a European destiny and therefore of 
a legitimate partaking in the unification and integration of 
Europe by Maltese sympathetic to the accession of Malta. At the 
bottom line, however, sound economics is likely to override glib 
political statements. 
It is expected that the Maltese industries most hard hit by 
accession would be those firms currently producing for the local 
market and still operating in relatively sheltered conditions. 
These would also include the small full-time farming community 
(2% of the total labour force and 4% of total GDP). 
Nevertheless, it is expected that Malta would be contributing to 
the EC in the region of 25/30 mecus annually mainly in the form 
of Common Customs Tariff and VAT contributions. It would however 
be receiving directly something in the region of 70/75 mecus 
annually derived mainly from that part of the structural funds 
intended for the development of backward regions. This would 
leave a minimum net annual balance of 40/50 mecus. Nor ought this 
balance crowd out direct aid received by Malta from third 
parties. 
The EC, already hard put by the added strains on 
following the collapse of the Eastern European Block 
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long list of aspiring members to deal with, may not be so willing 
to become a signatory to what looks like being a blatant economic 
rip-off, a case of intensified and institutionalised parasitism. 
There may also be institutional difficulties say, when Malta, as 
an EC member state, would occupy the Presidency of the EC Council 
of Ministers. Nevertheless, Mal ta's small size has been once 
again introduced into the debate as a bargaining factor: 
"Mal ta would be a net beneficiary from non-agricultural 
transfer payments and should have an easier passage in 
obtaining these because the magnitudes involved will hardly 
impinge on the overall Community budget"(64). 
* The factual information in this section is taken from EC 
Directorate, Malta(1990) Renort to the Prime Minister and 
Minister of Foreion Affairs regarding Malta's membership of the 
European Community, Malta, Government Printing Press. 
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NOTES 
1. See Payne(1991) and Hoefte & Oostindie(1991). 
2. When the Surinamese Premier Arran asked the Dutch Antillean 
Prime Minister Evartsz why the Antilles would not follow Surinam 
to independence, the reply was crude: "If you allow yourself to 
be hanged, it does not mean that I will do the same". quoted in 
Hoefte & Oostindie(1991, p.75). 
3. Hoefte & Oostindie(1991, p.93). 
4. Documented in Doumenge(1989) , Table 1, page 51. 
5. Houbert(1986, p.145). 
6. Bayliss Smith et.a!. (1988, p.289)i McKee & Tisdell(1990, 
p.170); Minogue(1983, p.69). 
7. Naipaul (1972, p.270). 
8. Bacchus(1989, pp.15-16). 
9. McKee & Tisdell(1990,pp.14,153). 
10. Higginson (1987, p.145); Seers(1982, pp.70,78). 
11. Ramsaran(1989, pp.1,139); McKee & Tisdell(1990, p.18); Barry 
et.a!. (1984, pp.64-5). 
12. McKee & Tisdell(1990, p.23). 
13. Wace(1980); Dommen(1981, p.8); Bhadhuri et.al. (1982, p.61); 
McKee & Tisdell(1990, p.164). 
14. Bertram & Watters(1985, p.500). 
15. McKee & Tisdell(1990, p.33). 
16. Bertram & Watters 1985; Connell (1988); Kaplinsky (1983, 
pp. 203-4) . 
17. Baldacchino (1993); Hoetjes (1992,pp.142-3); Hoogendonk 
(1989, p.104). 
18. An analogy suggested by Schaffer(1975, p.36). 
19. Franda(1982, p.120); Houbert(1980, pp.158-9); Bertram(1986, 
p.821); Crush & Wellings(1987, p.91) refer to these "barks not 
bites" microstate tactics in international relations. 
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20. Warrington (1992, p.230). 
21. Bu su t ti 1 (1988, p. 162) . 
22. 4th plan, p.3. 
23. 1st plan, p.5. 
24. Their views are reviewed in Sant(1984, pp.5-7). 
25. 1st plan, p.2. 
26. 1st plan, p.8; 2nd plan, p.16. 
27. 1st plan, p.6. 
28. "In January 1959, the British Government announced its 
intention to contribute 28 million pounds sterling over the next 
five years towards a development programme and this resulted in 
the launching of the first development plan for Malta" 
Briguglio (1981, p.2), emphasis mine. 
29. 2nd plan, p.2 
30. 2nd plan, p.l. 
31. 3rd plan, p.7. 
32. 3rd plan, p.8. 
33. 2nd plan, Appendix II, p.112. 
34. The Malta Pound was then pegged on a par with sterling. 
35. 3rd plan, p.17. 
36. Ibid. 
37. 3rd plan, p.56. 
38. Scicluna (1991, p.2) 
39. 4th plan, pp.51-2,59,96-103. 
40. 4th plan, p.51. 
41. 5th plan, Table II.l, p.l0. 
42. 5th plan, Table IV.3, p, .92. 
43. Baldacchino(1988) Table 2, p.66. 
44. 6th plan, p.94. 
45. 6th plan, p.2. 
46. Ibid. 
47. A. Sant, 'No Development Plan for Malta', The Times, (Maltese 
daily newspaper), 11th March 1990. 
48. J. A. Consiglio, 'The Case for an Economioc Plan', The Times, 
3rd March 1990, p.5. Emphasis in original. 
49. In A. Sant (1990), op.cit. 
50. Economic Development Plan, Editorial, The Times, 27th 
Feb.1990. 
51. Brewster (1973, pp.93-4). 
52. Brincat (1989, p.5). 
53. Baker(1992, p.213). 
54. See, for example, Reid(1974, p.22) and East(1973). 
55. Bowen-Jones(1972, p.59); Looney(1989, p.82). 
56. Dommen(1980, p.926). Graph is reproduced from this source. 
Butter(1985, p.67); Selwyn(1978) & Ward(1967, pp.81-2) propose 
a similar argument. 
57. Z ammi t ( 1984, p. 12) . 
58. Busuttil(1973, p.l). 
59. Baldacchino(1988, p.64). 
60. 2nd Plan, p.l. 
61. Metwally(1977, p.51); Zammit(1984, p.19). 
62. Jones(1971, p.130). 
63. Malta Round Table Conference, verbatim reports, plenary 
session: 22nd september 1955, CO 926/330, quoted in Pirotta(1991, 
p.79). 
64. 'The Experience of Smaller Countries wi th the European 
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Communi ty'. Lecture by Richard Pomfret, Chamber of Commerce, 
Valletta, Malta - 3rd Feb.1988. Reported in EC Directorate (1990, 
p.369). 
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